Russia finds a devastatingly simple way to make killer drones evade Ukrainian EW — doubles antennas to 32 and…
The Evolution of the Kometa Navigation System
The Kometa system, manufactured by the Russian firm VNIIR-Progress, is the cornerstone of Russia’s guided weapons navigation. At its core, the technology utilizes a multi-element antenna array—often referred to as "patch antennas"—that allows a drone or missile to maintain a steady satellite lock even when the surrounding electromagnetic environment is saturated with noise.
In a standard GPS or GLONASS receiver, a single antenna is easily overwhelmed by high-power jamming signals. The Kometa system, however, employs spatial filtering. By using multiple receiving elements, the processor can calculate the direction of incoming signals. If it detects a strong, unauthorized signal (jamming) originating from a specific direction, the system’s algorithms can effectively "null" or cancel out that signal while continuing to receive legitimate, weaker satellite navigation data from other directions.
Historically, the Russian military relied on 8-element or 16-element configurations. However, recent battlefield analysis by Ukrainian specialists has revealed a shift toward 20-element and, more alarmingly, 32-element arrays. The 32-element iteration, which has been identified on Shahed-136 (Geran-2) series drones targeting Kyiv, is not merely a quantitative increase; it represents a more sophisticated approach to signal resilience. By combining two 16-element arrays, these systems can operate across multiple frequency bands, such as the L1, L2, and L5 bands used by GNSS constellations, making them significantly harder to blind through single-frequency interference.
A Chronology of Electronic Escalation
The conflict has witnessed a rapid cycle of innovation and counter-innovation since 2022. Early in the invasion, Russian drones were frequently forced off course by basic, high-power "brute force" jammers deployed by Ukrainian forces. These devices flooded the spectrum with white noise, effectively breaking the link between the drone and the global positioning satellites.
By late 2023, however, the appearance of the upgraded Kometa modules began to alter the battlefield. As Russia ramped up production—with intelligence reports suggesting that the Russian defense industrial base has ordered over 100,000 such modules across various configurations—it became clear that electronic hardening was a strategic priority. The proliferation of these modules across the Geran, Iskander-M, Kinzhal, and the newer Filin cruise missile platforms indicates a standardized approach to navigation security.
Throughout 2024, Ukrainian EW units, including specialized groups like the "Night Watch" unit, began encountering these hardened systems with greater frequency. The discovery of the 32-element array served as a tactical wake-up call for Ukrainian defense tech developers, who recognized that the previous generation of jamming equipment was no longer sufficient to deter these incoming threats.
Data and Technical Implications
The shift from 16 to 32 elements is a direct response to the "signal-to-interference ratio" challenges. In electronic warfare, the effectiveness of a jammer is measured by its ability to push the noise floor above the signal level. With a 32-element array, the drone’s onboard computer has a much finer resolution for "spatial nulling." Essentially, the more elements an antenna has, the more "beams" of interference it can simultaneously suppress.
According to Serhii Beskrestnov, a prominent electronic warfare specialist and advisor to the Ukrainian government, the integration of these larger arrays effectively forces Ukraine to invest in more expensive and complex jamming infrastructure. If an antenna can filter out three or four distinct jamming sources, a standard wide-area jammer will fail to divert the drone. To combat this, Ukrainian forces are now forced to consider "coordinated jamming," where multiple EW stations operate in tandem to flood the entire hemisphere of the drone’s reception, rather than relying on a single localized emitter.
Counter-Strategies and Ukrainian Innovations
Despite the improved robustness of Russian navigation, Ukrainian experts maintain that the systems are not immune to disruption. The counter-strategy has shifted toward two primary methods: sophisticated multi-band jamming and "GPS spoofing."
"By creating two systems—one operating in the L1 band and the other covering L2/L5—we’ll be able to jam this antenna without any problems," said the commander of the Ukrainian Night Watch unit, known by the callsign "Alkhimik." This implies that the solution is to increase the density and frequency agility of Ukrainian electronic emitters to match the drone’s ability to filter signals.
A more surgical approach involves spoofing. Rather than simply destroying the signal, spoofing involves sending the drone fabricated coordinates that suggest it is still on its original flight path. Fly Group Ukraine, a private defense developer, has been instrumental in creating devices that transmit these false signals. By manipulating the navigation system’s input, the drone’s autopilot is tricked into believing it is following the correct trajectory while it is, in fact, being guided away from critical infrastructure toward unpopulated areas.
Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi, development director at Fly Group Ukraine, notes that this method is particularly effective because it does not trigger the drone’s "fail-safe" or "return-to-base" modes, which might otherwise activate if the drone detected a total loss of satellite connectivity.
Broader Strategic Impact
The failure to reliably disrupt these upgraded drones has significant ramifications for the defense of Ukrainian cities. If electronic warfare cannot effectively neutralize these incoming munitions, the burden of defense shifts to kinetic interceptors. This creates a dangerous economic imbalance: a low-cost, mass-produced drone equipped with a sophisticated antenna can force the expenditure of an interceptor missile that may cost ten to fifty times the price of the drone itself.
Furthermore, the intelligence gathered by Ukraine from these captured, upgraded units provides a vital look into the Russian defense supply chain. The fact that Russia has ordered over 100,000 modules suggests that Moscow has successfully integrated Western-derived or domestic-produced micro-electronics into a high-volume, industrialized production line. This level of scaling suggests that the Russian military is moving toward a doctrine where "jam-resistant" is a standard feature for all tactical weapons, rather than a luxury for high-value assets.
As the war progresses, the "cat and mouse" game of electronic warfare will likely move into the next phase: cognitive electronic warfare, where AI-driven jammers dynamically identify the frequency hopping patterns of the navigation systems in real-time. Until then, the focus remains on the physical antenna hardware and the signal processing algorithms that define the boundary between a successful strike and a failed mission. The outcome of this struggle will not only influence the trajectory of the war in Ukraine but will also serve as a foundational case study for future military conflicts worldwide, where the electromagnetic spectrum is as vital a domain as land, sea, or air.
